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The purpose of this paper will be to place the Imāmī theology 
of the Essence and Attributes of God in the context of the 
overall debate among the major interlocutors, the Imāmīs, the 
Mu‘tazila and the Ash‘arīs.  The main focus will be on two levels 
of dispute: issues of total divergence, like the imāmate, and 
issues of partial concurrence – where the essential concept is a 
matter of agreement, while the details are subject to significant 
doctrinal difference.
As the 5th/11th century was ushered in, theologians of 
all movements enjoyed some excellent opportunities to 
propagate and defend their doctrines in the midst of a well 
balanced distribution of sponsorship, which had hardly been 
in place before.  Despite the aforementioned “Qādirī Creed” 
that condemned anyone who strayed from its teachings as an 
unbeliever whose blood was to be shed with impunity, the actual 
practice towards such dissent was less threatening, thanks 
to Būyid tolerance, or perhaps indifference, and patronage. 
Mu‘tazilī theology had just reached a state of completion with 
the efforts of Qāđi ‘Abd al-Jabbār and his students, in spite of 
the decline in ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s own fortunes after the death of 
his admiring patron, al-şāhib b. ‘Abbād, in 385/995.(1) What has 
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been termed the “Sunnī revival”(2) was already 
underway in the form of Ħanbalī teachings 
benefiting from the Caliph’s political support 
as well as the popular sentiments of the 
residents of Baghdād, the majority of whom 
were Ħanbalīs.  In addition, the Ash‘arī School 
was burgeoning through the work of Abū Bakr 
al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013).  Then there was the 
Imāmī theology, the new structure of which 
was at an advanced stage of its development in 
the hands of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022).
Unlike the violent sectarian rivalry in 
Baghdad at the time, the theological debate 
involved no physical clashes.  The customary 
methods were either 
debates in teaching 
circles and the courts 
of rulers, or the 
writing of books and 
treatises addressing 
the opponent’s 
theological arguments. 
Occasionally, certain 
scholars anticipated the 
objections of their rivals 
and prepared their 
own pre-emptive responses.  This method 
became one of the distinctive characteristics 
of the work of al-Sharīf al-Murtađā whose 
treatises were often written in response to 
a hypothetical challenger, starting with the 
phrase, “If someone asks… We say…”
ALLÀH AND HIS ATTRIBUTES
The question of tawħīd is a point of 
agreement among all Muslims.  It is the first 
pillar of belief without which a person cannot 
be considered a Muslim.  Al-Ash‘arī’s concept 
of tawħīd follows the declaration of what 
he called Ašħāb al-Ħadīth wa Ahl al-Sunnah. 
Allāh, according to them, is one and unique, 
there is no other, and He is on His throne; He 
possesses hands, without resembling those of 
man; a pair of eyes and 
a face.  Additionally, He 
has knowledge, sight, 
hearing, and power. 
He can be seen on the 
Day of Judgment by the 
believers only.(3)  All of 
this was simply based 
on Qur‘ānic verses 
affirming, in their 
outward meaning, such 
concepts.  Since the 
Qur‘ān contains verses such as “His hands are 
spread out” (Q. 5:64)  and “I created with My 
own hands” (Q. 38:75), then Allāh is believed 
to possess hands, but the Ash‘arīs say these 
Unlike the violent sectarian rivalry in 
Baghdad at the time, the theological 
debate involved no physical clashes.  The 
customary methods were either debates 
in teaching circles and the courts of rulers, 
or the writing of books and treatises 
addressing the opponent’s theological 
arguments
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hands are unlike any other hands because 
Allāh is unlike any created being.
Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) makes 
a rational argument to prove the oneness of 
Allāh, bringing the Ash‘ārī concept of tawħīd 
closer to the Imāmī and Mu‘tazilī concept. 
It is perhaps this method that made al-
Shaykh al-Mufīd say, “[they] agreed on the 
words and disagreed on 
[the] meaning” of the 
concepts concerning the 
doctrine of tawħīd.(4) Al-
Bāqillānī states: 
“It is not possible [to 
claim] that the world has 
two or more creators. 
The evidence for this is 
that any two [entities] can disagree so that 
one of them creates something opposite to 
the will of the other.  Suppose that one of 
them wanted to keep a body alive but the 
other wanted it to die.  Either both are going 
to suffer subjection or one of them does…but 
subjection is a characteristic of created beings, 
not attributable to Allāh, the Eternal.”(5)
Imām al-Ħaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478-
1085) affirms the same doctrines in Kitāb al-
Irshād and follows the same rational method. 
But he disagrees with his Ash‘arī predecessors 
on some of the essentials.  For instance, 
he takes an Imāmī–Mu‘tazilī interpretive 
approach to what the Ash‘arī School held 
concerning Allāh’s supposed possession of a 
hand, a sight, a hearing and a face.  He says:
“Some of our imāms [i.e. al-Ash‘arī and his 
students] believed that the hands, the eyes 
and the face are permanent attributes (šifāt 
thābitah) of the Lord, 
the Exalted, and that 
the way to prove them 
is tradition rather than 
reason.  What we see to 
be right is to interpret 
the hands to mean 
potency (al-qudrah) 
and the eyes to mean 
vision and the face to mean existence.”(6)
This is the same argument advanced by 
al-Sharīf al-Murtađā in the beginning of the 
same century.  He argued that the meaning 
of the verse, “everything will perish except 
His face” (Q. 28:88) is that “everything will 
perish except for Him.”  Al-Murtađā concludes 
his argument by asking rhetorically, “How 
can these anthropomorphists interpret this 
verse and the one before it according to 
the outward meaning of the text?  Does not 
this [interpretation] necessitate that He, the 
Exalted, will perish and [only] His face will 
Imām al-Ħaramayn al-Juwaynī takes an 
Imāmī–Mu‘tazilī interpretive approach to 
what the Ash‘arī School held concerning 
Allāh’s supposed possession of a hand, a 
sight, a hearing and a face
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continue to exist?  This surely is blasphemy 
and ignorance on the part of those who say 
such things.”(7)
Al-Juwaynī also rejects al-Ash‘arī’s literal 
adherence to the ħadīth according to which 
the Prophet said, “Allāh the Exalted descends 
to the lower heaven and says: ‘Is there any 
a seeker of forgiveness?’”(8) He classifies 
this kind of ħadīth 
as “a single-sourced 
ħadīth, which does 
not necessitate any 
knowledge.”(9)  As to 
this particular ħadīth, 
al-Juwaynī deals with 
it only because it was 
recorded in the authoritative books of ħadīth 
(al-şiħāħ).  He says: “There is no good reason 
to interpret the descending in the sense of 
relocation, or vacating a place and occupying 
another, because this is a characteristic of 
bodies.”(10)
As for the Mu‘tazila, tawħīd is the first 
of their five pillars of faith.  ‘Abd al-Jabbār 
quotes Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī’s (d. 321/933) 
definition of tawħīd as “viewing the One as 
being one.”(11)  There are two meanings for the 
concept of Allāh’s being one: first, it means 
that Allāh cannot be divided; and second, 
He cannot be described by any characteristic 
possessed by created beings.  Abū  Hāshim’s 
father, Abū ‘Ali al-Jubbā‘ī (d. 303/916), 
provided a third meaning for the word one: 
Allāh is one in His eternality and there is no 
second.(12) Abū al-Ħasan al-Ash‘arī presents 
the Mu‘tazilī consensus on the concept of 
tawħīd in the following passage, which is 
worthy of being quoted in full:
“The Mu‘tazila 
unanimously agreed 
that Allāh is one. 
There is nothing like 
Him, and He is the 
One that hears and 
sees.  He is neither a 
body, a phantom, a 
form, a mass of flesh, a quantity of blood, a 
person, a substance (jawhar) nor an accident 
(‘arađ).  He has neither color, taste, smell, 
pulse, heat, coldness, moisture, dryness, 
length, breadth, depth, combination (ijtimā‘) 
nor severance (iftirāq).  He neither moves, 
nor pauses, and He is indivisible.  He has no 
limbs or organs.  He possesses no directions, 
nor right, left, front, behind, above or below. 
There is no space surrounding Him, nor there 
is a time passing by Him.  He does not come 
in contact with spaces, nor does He withdraw 
from them, nor does He occupy them.  He 
cannot be characterized with the attributes 
As for the Mu‘tazila, tawħīd is the first of 
their five pillars of faith.  ‘Abd al-Jabbār  
quotes Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī’s (d. 321/933) 
definition of tawħīd as “viewing the One as 
being one
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of created beings which are indicative of their 
createdness (ħudūthihim).  He may not be 
described as finite, nor moving in directions. 
He is unlimited.  He is neither a begetter, nor 
begotten.  Measures cannot comprehend 
Him and veils cannot hide Him.  He cannot be 
comprehended by the senses or compared 
to people, for He does not resemble created 
beings in any sense.  Deformations cannot 
befall Him and diseases cannot occur to Him. 
Nothing that comes to mind or the imagination 
reaches resembles Him.  He is the First, ever 
prior to created beings, Existent before them 
and He is ever knowing, powerful, and alive, 
and He is always so.  Eyes cannot see him 
and sight cannot perceive Him.  Imagination 
cannot comprehend Him and ears cannot hear 
Him.  He is a thing (shay‘) unlike all things; 
knowing, powerful and alive, but unlike other 
knowing, powerful and alive beings.  He alone 
is Eternal and there is none eternal but Him; 
and there is no deity 
other than Him.  He has 
no partner in His domain 
and no minister in His 
sovereignty.  He had no 
assistant in building what 
He built and creating 
what He created.  He 
did not create people 
according to any pre-existing model and the 
creation of any given thing is not harder or 
easier for Him than the creation of another. 
He obtains no benefits and sustains no losses. 
He experiences no pleasures, delight, harm or 
pain.  He has no limit to be finite and He is not 
subject to annihilation.  He does not possess 
any flaws or inability.  He is above being in 
contact with women or taking for Himself a 
wife or begetting children.”(13)
Al-Ash‘arī says this doctrine is shared 
by the Khawārij, groups of the Murji‘a, and 
groups of the Shī‘a.  This claim was confirmed 
by al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, who attributed the 
same doctrine to “all of the people of tawħīd, 
with the exception of the anthropomorphists 
(ahl al-tashbīh), who agreed on the words 
and disagreed on their meaning.”  Al-Mufīd 
singled out al-Ash‘arī as the first to say that 
Allāh possesses eternal attributes “which are 
neither Him, nor other than Him… and he 
claimed that Allāh the 
Exalted possesses an 
eternal face, an eternal 
hearing, an eternal 
sight, and two eternal 
hands.”(14)
As the Mu‘tazilī–
Imāmī agreement 
on many theological 
Al-Mufīd singled out al-Ash‘arī as the 
first to say that Allāh possesses eternal 
attributes “which are neither Him, nor 
other than Him… and he claimed that 
Allāh the Exalted possesses an eternal 
face, an eternal hearing, an eternal sight, 
and two eternal hands
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doctrines will continue to appear before us, 
it is important to address now an important 
point concerning the two schools: the claim 
that Imāmī theology 
has Mu‘tazilī origins. 
For instance, Adam Mez 
writes: “Theologically, 
the Shī‘a are the heirs 
of the Mu‘tazilahs 
whose lack of tradition-
mindedness was 
particularly helpful to 
them.”(15) Following 
on this path, Wilferd 
Madelung traces the Imāmī adoption of kalām 
to the second half of the 3rd/9th century, 
when a group of Mu‘tazilī theologians “joined 
the Imāmiyya by adopting their basic doctrine 
of the imamate while retaining Mu‘tazilite 
theology.”(16) The two names he put forward 
were members of the Banū Nawbakht family: 
Abū Sahl Ismā‘īl al-Nawbakhtī (d. 311/923) 
and his nephew, al-Ħasan b. Mūsā (d. betw. 
300 and 310/912 and 922).  In addition to 
the necessity of accommodating certain 
Imāmī beliefs, Madelung points out that 
their “introduction of Mu‘tazilite doctrine in 
Imamism was hampered…[by] the opposition 
of the Imamite traditionalists, who, much 
like their Sunnite counterparts, rejected on 
principle all forms of kalām and its extensive 
use of reason in religion and insisted on 
relying on the ħadīths of the Prophet and the 
Imams.”(17) The major 
adversary in this respect 
was Muħammad b. ‘Ali 
b. Bābawayh al-Qummī, 
known as al-Shaykh al-
şadūq (d. 381/991).
This argument 
runs against what the 
Imāmiyya themselves 
stated about the origins 
of their kalām.  Shaykh 
al-Ţā‘ifah al-Ţūsī (460/1068) presented a short 
biography for ‘Ali b. Ismā‘īl b. Maytham al-
Tammār, the grandson of a close associate of 
Imām ‘Ali.  About this man, al-Ţūsī says that he 
was “the first to engage in kalām (takallama) 
along the lines of the Imāmī school.  He wrote 
a book about the imāmate and titled it “al-
Kāmil”…”(18) This account establishes the 
beginning of Imāmī kalām in the first half of 
the 2nd/8th century.  It is also worthwhile to 
point out the view of al-Sharīf al-Murtađā (d. 
436/1044):
“Let it be known to you that the origins of 
Unity (al-tawħīd) and Justice (al-‘adl) are taken 
from the speeches of the Commander of the 
Faithful, [‘Ali b. Abi Ţālib,] peace be upon him. 
al-Sharīf al-Murtađā Let it be known to 
you that the origins of Unity (al-tawħīd) 
and Justice (al-‘adl) are taken from the 
speeches of the Commander of the 
Faithful, [‘Ali b. Abi Ţālib,] peace be upon 
him.  They contain, about this subject, 
what cannot be added to or improved 
upon
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They contain, about this subject, what cannot 
be added to or improved upon.  Whoever 
contemplates what has been transmitted 
from his words about this subject, will realize 
that all the elaboration of the theologians 
(mutakallimūn), their compilations and books, 
are mere elaborations of these sentences 
and explanations of these doctrines.  Theses 
uses attributed to his progeny, the Imams, 
peace be upon them, what cannot be 
enumerated, because 
of its abundance.  All of 
this is available for those 
who seek such details in 
reference books.  They 
can retrieve that which 
can cure ill hearts and 
barren minds.”(19)
Al-Murtađā is not 
alone in this claim.  His 
Mu‘tazilī contemporary, 
Qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. 
415/1024), includes ‘Ali b. Abi Ţālib in the first 
generation (Ţabaqah) of the Mu‘tazila.  His 
second generation of the Mu‘tazila is made 
up exclusively of the sons and associates 
of Imām ‘Ali.(20) Both scholars quote the 
same statements to support their claims. 
Considering the theology of Imām ‘Ali and his 
descendants and associates, it is obvious that 
they do not fit the definition of the Mu‘tazila. 
Neither Imām ‘Ali, nor any of his sons or 
close associates believed in the intermediate 
position of the grave sinner between belief and 
unbelief (al-manzilatu bayna-l-manzilatayn) or 
the certainty of fulfillment of God’s threat (al-
wa‘īd).(21) These doctrines represent two of 
the cardinal – and distinct – beliefs on which 
all of the Mu‘tazila agreed.  Moreover, the 
leading Mu‘tazilī scholars had no consensus 
concerning Imām ‘Ali 
and his opponents; a 
majority agreed on two 
equal scenarios with 
the possibility of ‘Ali’s 
being either right or 
wrong, while the chief 
Mu‘tazilī theologian, 
Abū Bakr al-Ašamm, 
claimed that ‘Ali was 
not an imām because 
there was no consensus 
on his imāmate, unlike Mu‘āwiyah who 
enjoyed such a consensus, and was therefore 
imām.(22)
It is not difficult to trace the main Mu‘tazilī 
doctrine back to the theology of Imām ‘Ali. 
But interpreting this Mu‘tazilī dependency 
on his thought to mean that Imām ‘Ali 
was a Mu‘tazilī involves a historical fallacy, 
It is not difficult to trace the main 
Mu‘tazilī doctrine back to the theology of 
Imām ‘Ali. But interpreting this Mu‘tazilī 
dependency on his thought to mean 
that Imām ‘Ali was a Mu‘tazilī involves a 
historical fallacy, just like considering the 
Imāmiyya to be theologically dependent 
on the Mu‘tazila
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just like considering the Imāmiyya to be 
theologically dependent on the Mu‘tazila.  It 
is my argument that this misunderstanding 
originates in political circumstances; namely, 
the patronage received by the Mu‘tazila from 
the ‘Abbāsid caliphs in the 3rd/9th century. 
Had the Imāmiyya received similar patronage, 
the relation would have been reversed. 
The conventional wisdom concerning the 
dependency of Imāmī theology on the Mu‘tazila 
can only be sustained if we were to believe that 
the Imāmiyya ceased to exist intellectually 
from the time of Imām ‘Ali to the time of al-
Mufīd, or that they took another belief and 
returned to Imām ‘Ali’s theology in the late 
4th/10th century.  Neither statement can be 
substantiated.  Indeed, 
the Shī‘ī theology is the 
continuing legacy of 
Imām ‘Ali, while many 
Mu‘tazilī leaders did 
not even admit their 
intellectual debt to him.
Now let us turn to Imām ‘Ali’s doctrines that 
were either taken verbatim or paraphrased by 
the Mu‘tazila.  The doctrine of tawħīd which 
Qāđī ‘Abd al-Jabbār attributed to Abū ‘Ali al-
Jubbā‘ī and his son, Abū Hāshim, is that tawħīd 
means that Allāh cannot be divided; that He 
cannot be described by any characteristic 
possessed by created beings; and that Allāh is 
one in His eternality and there is no second.  
Here is what Imām ‘Ali says about Allāh: 
“The First – nothing is before Him – and the 
last – nothing will be after Him.  Imaginations 
cannot capture an attribute for Him nor 
can hearts comprehend Him.  He cannot be 
divided, nor does He possess any components. 
Hearts and sight cannot encompass Him.”(23) 
And he says in another sermon that Allāh is 
“the First before any first and the Last after any 
last.”(24)  This same concept is found in several 
other sermons with variation in language, as 
in his statement that Allāh’s “being is prior to 
times; His existence is prior to nonexistence 
and his eternality is prior to the creation 
[of the world]…He 
cannot be surrounded 
by limits or counted 
by numbers.”(25) 
Additionally, a cursory 
glance at al-Ash‘arī’s 
summation of Mu‘tazilī 
concept of tawħīd and the attributes (quoted 
above), will reveal that all the main concepts 
are taken – in form and in content – from 
Imām ‘Ali’s sermons.(26)
The question of the attributes attracted 
further debate and caused deeper fissures 
among Muslim theologians.  This debate 
The negative attributes derive from the 
agreement of all Muslim schools that 
Allāh is neither a body, a substance, nor is 
He an accident
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starts with some common ground regarding 
the two classifications of attributes: the 
first is the distinction between the negative 
attributes (al-šifāt al-salbiyyah), which are not 
to be appropriately attributed to Allāh in any 
way, and the positive attributes (al-šifāt al-
thubūtiyyah); and the second is the distinction 
between the two types 
of positive attributes 
and classifying them 
as the attributes of the 
Essence (šifāt al-dhāt) or 
the attributes of the acts 
(šifāt al-af‘āl).
The negative attributes derive from the 
agreement of all Muslim schools that Allāh 
is neither a body, a substance, nor is He an 
accident.  He has neither color, taste, nor 
smell.  Other examples of this type of negative 
attributes are listed in al-Ash‘arī’s statement 
quoted above.  Between this category and 
the category of positive attributes, the 
Imāmī theologian Abū al-Fatħ al-Karājikī (d. 
449/1057) inserts another type, which he 
called “metaphorical attributes” (al-šifāt al-
majāziyyah).  They are attributes that may be 
appropriately ascribed to Allāh but only in a 
metaphorical way, distinct from the literal 
meaning of such attributes when they are 
used to describe created beings.  Under this 
class al-Karājikī lists attributes such as willing, 
hating, angry, pleased, hearing, seeing and 
comprehending.  The reason we use these 
attributes, he notes, is that they came to us 
by way of authentic tradition, and we must 
realize that they occurred in the tradition 
according to the figurative style and flexibility 
of the Arabic language, 
not their literal 
meanings.(27)  With this 
original contribution,(28) 
al-Karājikī struck a 
compromise between 
the theologians who 
refused to consider 
them attributes – like al-Murtađā and some 
Bašran Mu‘tazila – and the Ash‘arīs who 
considered them positive ones.
The positive attributes are either directly 
connected to the Essence or indirectly related 
to it through the acts.  Al-Mufīd says that the 
attributes of the Essence are eternal, while 
the attributes of the acts are contingent upon 
the performance of those acts:
“Allāh’s attributes are two kinds.  The first 
pertains to the Essence, hence they are called 
šifāt al-dhāt, and the second kind pertains to 
the acts and they are attributes of those acts. 
What is meant by the attributes of the Essence 
is that they are intrinsically deserved by the 
Al-Mufīd says that the attributes of the 
Essence are eternal, while the attributes 
of the acts are contingent upon the 
performance of those acts
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very Essence and not by, or for, something 
else.  Whereas the meaning of the attributes 
of acts is that they become essential only 
after the presence of the act and not before 
its presence.”(29)
  Allāh has always been and will always 
be living, knowing, and omnipotent.  The 
attributes of the acts, on the other hand, are 
appropriately ascribed to Allāh only after He 
performs the acts.  It is not appropriate, al-
Mufīd argues, to call 
Allāh a creator (khāliq) 
before He created 
anything.  One reason 
for this distinction is to 
avoid the interpretation 
of the eternality of the 
world, which might 
be inferred from the 
assertion that Allāh has always been a creator. 
Another difference he presents between the 
two categories of divine attributes pertains to 
the possibility of suspending the application 
of certain attributes at a given time.  The first 
category cannot be suspended at any time or 
be substituted by its opposite.  One cannot 
say at any time that Allāh is not knowing or 
not living, because these are the attributes of 
the Essence.  But one can say that Allāh is not 
giving at a certain moment when the giving 
is not happening at that moment, and it is 
appropriate to say that Allāh is not causing the 
death of certain person before He does so.(30)
It is the first group of attributes (šifāt al-
dhāt) that caused the major dispute between 
the Ash‘arīs and their opponents, at one 
level, and between the Imāmiyya and and 
some groups from the Mu‘tazila at a different 
level.  The genesis of this dispute relates to 
the Ash‘arī claim that the attributes of the 
Essence are eternal and 
they are distinct from 
the Essence.  Al-Juwaynī 
says, “the doctrine 
of the guided people 
[i.e. his fellow Ash‘arī 
theologians] is that the 
Exalted Creator is alive, 
knowing and powerful; 
possessing eternal life, eternal knowledge, 
eternal power and eternal will.”(31)  The Ash‘arī 
argument had already been stated by Abū 
Bakr al-Bāqillānī as follows:
“If someone says, ‘Why did you say that the 
Eternal, Exalted is He, has a life, knowledge, 
power, hearing, sight, speech and will?’  We 
say that a living, knowing and powerful 
[person] from among us can only be described 
as alive, knowing, powerful, speaking and 
willing because he has a life, knowledge, 
It is the first group of attributes (šifāt 
al-dhāt) that caused the major dispute 
between the Ash‘arīs and their opponents, 
at one level, and between the Imāmiyya 
and and some groups from the Mu‘tazila 
at a different level
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power, hearing, sight and will; and this is the 
benefit of calling him alive, knowing, powerful 
and willing.”(32)
However, this position was rejected by later 
Ash‘arī theologians.  Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 
606/1209) was quoted as mocking his Ash‘arī 
predecessors for their 
criticism of Christians for 
claiming three eternals 
while they claimed 
nine – referring to the 
Essence and eight other 
eternal attributes.(33)
On the other side of the debate, there 
was the doctrine of the Imāmiyya and the 
Mu‘tazila who said that Allāh is alive by 
Himself – not by a separate life – and the 
same is true of the rest of the attributes of the 
Essence.(34) This consensus was disturbed by 
Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī and his followers from 
among the Bašran Mu‘tazila, who introduced 
the concept of aħwāl (sing. ħāl: states) instead 
of attributes.  Abū Hāshim argued against the 
Ash‘arī doctrine of distinct attributes and the 
Imāmī–Mu‘tazilī doctrine which states that 
the Essence and the attributes are one.  The 
theory of aħwāl that was associated with 
him states that Allāh is powerful because He 
possesses a ħāl that occurs to the Essence and 
this ħāl is not the Essence.  The ħāl, according 
to Abū Hāshim, is neither existent, nor non-
existent; neither eternal, nor created; and 
neither known, nor unknown.  It can only be 
known with the Essence.(35) The reason for this 
statement was that Abū Hāshim considered 
the unknown and the non-existent to be things 
(ashyā‘).  Saying that 
a given ħāl is existent 
or non-existent would 
force him to side either 
with the Ash‘arīs or 
with their opponents, 
because a given thing 
has to be either distinct 
from the Essence (Ash‘arī doctrine) or not 
separate (Imāmī–Mu‘tazilī doctrine).  As to 
the statement that a ħāl is neither eternal, 
nor created, the purpose of which was to 
avoid the choice between affirming another 
eternal being and asserting that Allāh may 
acquire accidents (a‘rāđ).  One of the main 
exponents of this theory was, oddly, the chief 
Ash‘arī theologian al-Juwaynī, who devoted a 
chapter in his book, al-Irshād, under the title: 
Affirming the aħwāl and refuting those who 
denied them.(36)
Among the main controversies stemming 
from the different concepts of Allāh’s 
attributes was the vision of Allāh (al-ru‘yah). 
The Ash‘arī affirmation that He can be seen 
The ħāl, according to Abū Hāshim, is 
neither existent, nor non-existent; neither 
eternal, nor created; and neither known, 
nor unknown.  It can only be known with 
the Essence
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by the believers only was rejected by the 
Imāmiyya and the Mu‘tazila, who deny the 
possibility of such vision.  The Ash‘arī belief 
is based on the outward meaning of several 
Qur‘ānic verses such as, “On that day, certain 
faces are resplendent; looking toward their 
Lord” (Q. 75:22-23).  And, unlike the Imāmiyya 
and the Mu‘tazila, who make proximity and 
position of the object conditions for vision, 
the Ash‘arīs claim that existence of the object 
is the only condition for it.(37)
The opponents of the Ash‘arī doctrine, 
including the Imāmiyya, base their belief on 
the verses that appear to deny the vision like, 
“[Men’s] eyes cannot comprehend Him” (Q. 
6:103) and His response 
to Mūsā, “You will not 
see Me” (Q. 7:143).  As 
to the verse cited by the 
Ash‘arīs, the Imāmiyya 
and the Mu‘tazila 
interpret it as figurative 
speech.  Al-Sharīf al-
Murtađā refutes the 
Ash‘arī reading of Q. 
75:22-23 and says that there is an implied 
word in the verse which would read as “On 
that day, certain faces are resplendent; 
looking toward the reward of their Lord.”  He 
also suggests another possibility, which would 
make the word “ilā” a noun – in a position of 
direct object – rather than a preposition.  “Ilā” 
in this case would mean “bounty”.(38)
The justice of Allāh (al-‘adl) is another 
important example of basic agreement 
which is nonetheless hampered by serious 
differences in interpretation.  While all schools 
agree that Allāh is just (‘ādil), they disagree on 
what this statement means.  For the Ash‘arīs, 
Allāh’s performing of any act constitutes the 
genesis of justice in this act; in other words, 
whatever Allāh does is, by definition, a just act.
(39) By contrast the Imāmiyya and the Mu‘tazila 
interpret the statement that Allāh is just in the 
sense that He only does what is inherently a 
just act.  At the roots 
of this dispute is the 
difference between the 
proponents of the two 
approaches concerning 
the concept of rational 
good and rational bad 
(al-ħusn wa al-qubħ 
al-‘aqliyyān).  There 
are three bases for 
considering something good or bad: first, in 
relation to its being perfect or defective, as the 
former is considered good and the latter bad; 
second, in relation to a subsequent benefit or 
harm; and third, in relation to a subsequent 
Al-Sharīf al-Murtađā refutes the Ash‘arī 
reading of Q. 75:22-23 and says that there 
is an implied word in the verse which 
would read as “On that day, certain faces 
are resplendent; looking toward the 
reward of their Lord
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praise and reward or 
blame and punishment 
in accordance with the 
religious law.  The role 
of reason in the last 
category was the subject 
of dispute among Muslim theologians.  
The Ash‘arīs denied that the good and 
the bad can be reached by reason, especially 
in matters relevant to religious obligation. 
Al-Juwaynī says that “the considerations 
of goodness and badness are derived from 
the sources of religious law (al-shar‘) and 
revelation (al-sam‘), and the basis for this 
statement is that a given thing cannot be 
inherently good because of itself, its kind or 
its enduring attributes; and the same goes for 
its being bad.”  For al-Juwaynī, the definition 
of what is good is merely an act “whose doer 
was praised in the religious law,” while what 
is bad is any act “whose doer was blamed in 
the religious law.”(40) The Mu‘tazila and the 
Imāmiyya, on the other hand, believe that 
reason is the judge of goodness and badness 
in the acts and the law confirms reason’s 
judgment.  Their argument is that acts such 
as telling the truth and being kind to others 
are judged to be good by reason, whether the 
divine law says anything on them or not.  That 
is why they are considered good by those who 
deny religion and those 
who have no knowledge 
about religious rulings 
on such acts.  The same 
goes for the badness of 
the opposite acts.
The late Mu‘tazila and the Imāmiyya, 
however, had their own differences on certain 
matters of detail.  For the early Mu‘tazila 
and the Imāmiyya, the goodness or badness 
of an act are derived from the act itself, not 
from a separate characteristic pertaining to 
the act.  But the late Mu‘tazila considered 
goodness and badness as a function of a 
characteristic of the act which makes it good 
or bad – such as a moral characteristic.  Abū 
al-Ħusayn al-Bašrī (d. 436/1044) argued that 
only the bad possesses such a characteristic, 
whereas a good act is such because of its lack 
of a characteristic associated with a bad act. 
He also placed conditions on considering an 
act a bad act, such as the ability, choice and 
knowledge.  An act carried out by a person who 
is coerced or who is acting without knowledge 
of the badness of the act is considered neither 
good nor bad.  Other late Mu‘tazila, like al-
Jubbā‘ī, denied such characteristics, but 
attached the goodness and badness to the 
consequences of the act.  Slapping an orphan, 
says al-Jubbā‘ī, can be good if it is for the sake 
The Ash‘arīs denied that the good and the 
bad can be reached by reason, especially 
in matters relevant to religious obligation
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of discipline and it can be bad if it is an act of 
cruelty.(41)
The Imāmiyya and the Mu‘tazila agreed that 
Allāh is capable of justice and injustice, but He 
elects to do justice only.  The only dissent is 
the position of al-Nażżām (d. 223/837) and 
his circle who believed that Allāh is unable 
to act contrary to justice.(42) From the justice 
of Allāh, the Mu‘tazila derive their belief that 
doing what is most beneficial (al-ašlaħ) for 
the people and showing kindness (luţf) by 
facilitating their obedience and discouraging 
disobedience are incumbent upon Him.  If He 
elects to do otherwise He would be unjust 
(żālim).(43) Although the Imāmiyya presented 
a different reasoning, they did agree with the 
Mu‘tazila on the principle of the incumbency 
of luţf and al-ašlaħ.  They say these are 
incumbent upon Allāh as part of His liberality 
and generosity, but if He were not to offer 
them He would not be unjust.  Late Mu‘tazilī 
theologians, however, 
believed that, in 
accordance with Allāh’s 
justice, only what is 
good and beneficial 
are incumbent upon 
Him, but not what is 
most good and most 
beneficial.  As to the 
Imāmiyya, the luţf can only be complete 
if it involves what is most good and most 
beneficial.  The Imāmī theologian Abū al-
Fatħ al-Karājikī (d. 449/1057) attributes this 
Mu‘tazili belief to both Jubbā‘īs and most of 
his own contemporaries.  Al-Karājikī excepts 
from it Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) and 
his school, al-Ka‘biyya, who are in agreement 
with the Imāmiyya:
“What is believed by [Abū ‘Ali] al-Jubbā‘ī 
and his son ‘Abd al-Salām and their followers, 
who constitute most of today’s Mu‘tazila, is 
that even though Allāh, the Exalted, is just and 
generous, He does not provide what is most 
good for His creation, and does not provide 
for them what is most beneficial.  Instead, He 
only provides for them [a level] of goodness 
and benefits less than the most beneficial, 
in spite of their need for what He denies 
them.”(44)
Another corollary of the debate on Allāh’s 
justice is the question of 
predestination (al-jabr), 
free will (al-tafwīđ) and 
the genesis of human 
acts.  The Mu‘tazila said 
that the will of human 
beings is entirely free 
and that man is able to 
do what he pleases or 
The Imāmiyya and the Mu‘tazila agreed 
that Allāh is capable of justice and 
injustice, but He elects to do justice 
only.  The only dissent is the position 
of al-Nażżām (d. 223/837) and his circle 
who believed that Allāh is unable to act 
contrary to justice
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refrain from whatever he chooses not to do. 
The purpose of this argument was to exculpate 
Allāh from all kinds of evil and injustice and 
to affirm the rationale for religious obligation 
and the purpose of reward and punishment.
(45) Furthermore, they divided human acts into 
voluntary and involuntary; and into direct and 
indirect acts.  Voluntary acts are performed 
with human knowledge and free will, and 
they are the acts that fall within the realm of 
religious obligation.  Involuntary acts are the 
ones that occur without human free will, such 
as the burning of fire.  These, according to 
the Mu‘tazila, are attributed to human beings 
figuratively (majāzan).(46)  Direct acts are those 
acts which are performed for an intended 
purpose and according to human will; while 
indirect acts are unintended, but they occur 
as consequence of a direct act.  As Abū Ja‘far 
al-Iskāfi (d. 240/854) 
explains it: “every act 
that occurs by mistake 
and is not intended and 
without the will for it 
[to occur] is an indirect 
act; and every act which 
cannot occur without 
intention, so that 
each part in it needs a 
renewal  of the will and 
purpose, is excluded 
from the realm of indirect acts, and is a direct 
act.”(47)
The purpose of this classification of acts 
was to assign the responsibility for every act 
and determine the party to praise or to blame. 
This concern was present in the work of ‘Abd 
al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), who is a faithful 
follower of his predecessors in adopting the 
same classification of acts.  Answering an 
objection of some unidentified opponents, he 
wrote the following:
“The [opponents] say, ‘Your belief in 
indirect acts leads to the possibility of 
someone’s deserving blame or praise for an 
act after his death – and deserving reward or 
punishment in this case – which is known to 
be false because he would not deserve it if he 
acted while inattentive, much less when he is 
dead[...]’  The answer is that, in our doctrine, 
it is not unfeasible to 
deserve blame or praise 
– as well as punishment 
and reward – for an 
indirect act because 
we consider it similar 
to direct acts in this 
concern if one acts 
while knowing, or being 
able to know, about his 
condition […]  As to 
The Mu‘tazila said that the will of human 
beings is entirely free and that man is 
able to do what he pleases or refrain 
from whatever he chooses not to do.  The 
purpose of this argument was to exculpate 
Allāh from all kinds of evil and injustice 
and to affirm the rationale for religious 
obligation and the purpose of reward and 
punishment
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our judgment on the inattentive doer, that he 
deserves no blame or praise for his acts, it is 
because he cannot guard against acting while 
being inattentive.  This is not the case with 
an indirect act because the doer can guard 
against doing what leads to it if he knows, or 
suspects, that it will follow.  But if this does 
not occur to him, then he would be judged like 
the inattentive person.”(48)
There is, however, a difference among the 
Mu‘tazila on the assignment of blame.  Al-
Jubbā‘īs considered an indirect act, whose 
doer is inattentive, to be neither good, nor bad; 
hence, no blame or praise can be deserved.  But 
Abū Abdillāh al-Bašrī (d. 369/979) considered 
this act as a kind of injustice (żulm), which is 
bad, but the doer does not deserve blame for 
it because he could not guard against it.(49)
The Imāmī doctrine is derived from a ħadīth 
attributed to the sixth Imām, Ja‘far al-şādiq, 
who said, lā jabra wa lā tafwīđ bal amrun 
bayna amrayn (there is neither predestination, 
nor free will; but 
[there is] a position 
between these two 
positions).  Al-Shaykh 
al-Mufīd elaborates 
on this concept by 
defining predestination 
as “coercion to do the 
act by force and domination, and the real 
meaning of this is creating the act in human 
beings without the existence of a power 
in them to stop it or refuse to accept it.” 
As to free will, he defines it as “lifting any 
ban on people to act and giving them the 
license to do whatever they please.”(50)  The 
Shī‘ī alternative is an intermediary position 
between the two extremes of the Ash‘arī 
complete predestination and the Mu‘tazilī 
complete free will:
“Allāh, the Exalted, enabled humans to do 
their acts and made possible for them their 
deeds, and drew up for them in this respect 
the rules and regulations.  He prohibited them 
from evil acts by strict rebuke, inducing fear, 
promise and threat.  Therefore, by enabling 
them to do certain deeds He was neither 
forcing them to do those deeds, nor giving 
them license to [choose] to do those deeds; 
because He prohibited them from most of the 
deeds and He established the rules for them 
regarding them.  He 
also ordered them to 
do the good ones and 
prohibited them from 
doing the bad ones.”(51)
At the heart of this 
question is a conflict 
between the partisans 
One of the main requirements of justice 
is to refrain from unjust acts, which 
means among other things placing a limit 
on what Allāh does.  While consistent 
with justice, this limit contravenes the 
concept of Allāh’s omnipotence
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of Allāh’s justice (al-‘adl) and the partisans 
of His omnipotence (al-qudrah).  One of the 
main requirements of justice is to refrain from 
unjust acts, which means among other things 
placing a limit on what Allāh does.  While 
consistent with justice, this limit contravenes 
the concept of Allāh’s omnipotence.  Muslim 
theologians followed three different ways of 
solving this contradiction.  The Imāmiyya and 
a group of the Mu‘tazila believe that Allāh is 
capable of the acts that would be considered 
injustice if He performed them, but He does 
not perform them.(52) Shaykh al-Ţā‘ifah al-Ţūsī 
explained the reason for this abstention from 
doing bad deeds by the 
absence of causes for 
such deeds.  He argued 
that “a person may not 
carry out bad acts unless 
he is either ignorant 
of their badness or is 
in need to act in such 
manner.  And since Allāh 
has full knowledge of the badness of bad acts 
just as He has full knowledge that He does not 
need to perform such acts, therefore He does 
not do them.”(53) Al-Ţūsī provides the example 
of someone who has the choice between 
telling the truth and lying when both choices 
get him what he wants.  Knowing the badness 
of lying and the equality in consequences 
from both choices, al-Ţūsī says that this person 
would undoubtedly choose telling the truth, 
as rational people would agree.
Other Mu‘tazila believed that Allāh is 
unable to carry out bad deeds.  Qāđi ‘Abd al-
Jabbār attributed this position to al-Nażżām, 
his student Abū ‘Ali al-Aswārī and al-Jāħiż. 
He also accused of holding it most of the 
believers in predestination, the Ħashwiyya, 
the Murji‘a and the “Rawāfiđ.”(54) It is clear 
that the Imāmiyya are not to be included in 
‘Abd al-Jabbār’s Rawāfiđ, for al-Shaykh al-
Mufīd reports a consensus on the Imāmiyya 
position – that Allāh is capable of both justice 
and injustice although 
He does not act unjustly 
– including all the 
Mu‘tazila (excluding 
al-Nażżām), some of 
the Murji‘a, and the 
traditionists (Ašħāb 
al-Ħadīth).  From this 
and the use of a pejorative term, it seems 
that ‘Abd al-Jabbār was engaged in some 
form of hyperbole rather than an accurate 
representation of what his opponents actually 
believed.  
The essential difference between the 
Mu‘tazila and the Imāmiyya rests in a subtle, 
but important, detail concerning the belief 
it seems that ‘Abd al-Jabbār was engaged 
in some form of hyperbole rather than 
an accurate representation of what his 
opponents actually believed
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that Allāh is above carrying out bad deeds. 
The Mu‘tazila view this as an obligatory 
prerequisite of justice and argue that were He 
not above performing evil deeds, this would 
in itself be proof of oppression on the part of 
Allāh.  By contrast, the Imāmiyya view it as a 
voluntary abstention emanating from Allāh’s 
grace and magnificence.
Al-Sharīf al-Murtađā 
takes this argument 
a step further to 
declare that good 
deeds emanate from 
Allāh by means of His 
orders and incentives, 
while bad deeds 
are the responsibility of the people, and 
they emanate from Satan by means of his 
encouragement and seduction.  With this 
understanding regarding the origin of human 
acts, al-Murtađā continues with a dramatic 
depiction of the corollary from the beliefs of 
his opponents:
“Some claim that [Allāh] includes in 
punishment and torment small children who 
are blameless of any guilt or crime.  Others 
do not rule out that Allāh, the exalted, would 
order his servants – with their current capacity 
and physique – to fly in the sky and catch the 
stars and move mountains and fold the skies 
like a scroll.  But if they fail to do it because 
of their natural inaptitude, He would torment 
them in eternal Hellfire.”(55)
This is hardly an exaggeration of the Ash‘arī 
position on such questions.  Indeed, Ash‘arī 
scholars are vocal about affirming these 
positions as essential parts of their theology. 
For instance, Abū al-
Ħasan al-Ash‘arī himself 
declares that “the fate 
of children is left for 
Allāh; He may torment 
them or do what He 
pleases with them.”(56) 
As to the obligation to 
move mountains and 
fly in the skies like birds do, al-Ïjī says “this is 
part of what we allow, even though it has not 
occurred in the real word.”(57) And in a chapter 
on Allāh’s mandating that humans carry 
out what they cannot do, the chief Ash‘arī 
theologian in the 5th/11th century, Imām al-
Ħaramayn al-Juwaynī, writes:
“There are many forms of mandating what 
is not within human capacity (taklīf mā lā 
yuţāq), such as combining the two opposites 
and performing what is out of the realm of 
possibilities.  The truth, in our doctrine, is that 
such thing is allowed rationally and it is not 
impossible.”(58)
The essential difference between the 
Mu‘tazila and the Imāmiyya rests in a 
subtle, but important, detail concerning 
the belief that Allāh is above carrying out 
bad deeds
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ALLÀH’S WORD
There is a consensus that the attribute 
“mutakallim” (speaker) is one of Allāh’s 
positive attributes.  Yet this consensus was 
marred by the injurious debate over the 
nature of His speech: eternal (azalī) or created 
in time (muħdath). At the peak of this debate, 
the Mu‘tazila made use of the support of the 
Abbāsid caliphs al-Ma‘mūn, al-Mu‘tašim and 
al-Wāthiq (209/824 – 232/847)  to wage a 
coercive campaign against the opponents of 
their doctrine concerning the createdness of 
the Qur‘ān.  What began as a scholarly dispute 
was later instituted as a wave of violent 
practice of intolerance by the Mu‘tazila, who 
are often referred to 
as the “free thinkers 
of Islam.”  This period 
of persecution was 
known as the miħnah 
(the ordeal).  Judges 
had to agree with 
them on this particular doctrine – those who 
believed in the eternality of the Qur‘ān were 
purged and replaced by supporters of the 
Mu‘tazilī view.  At some point, even Muslim 
prisoners of war were not ransomed if they 
did not attest that the Qur‘ān was created, 
not eternal.  Among the famous figures to be 
persecuted was Aħmad b. Ħanbal, who spent 
eighteen months under torture, but remained 
firm in his belief in the uncreatedness of the 
Qur‘ān.  The miħnah was over when a new 
Abbāsid caliph, al-Mutawakkil, came to power 
in 232/847.  He turned against the Mu‘tazila 
two years later and commanded that no one 
should claim that the Qur‘ān was created.
The 5th/11th century thus witnessed a 
reversal of fortunes.  The Ħanbalīs came 
to power with a vengeance, targeting the 
Mu‘tazila and the Shī‘a on many doctrinal 
points, but the emphasis on the createdness 
of the Qur‘ān was the lead doctrine.  In 
420/1029, the Caliph al-Qādir endorsed a 
decree considering those who believed in the 
createdness of the Qur‘ān in a state of fisq, 
and the same was done 
a few months later in 
the same year – all 
prominent scholars 
were summoned to 
the Caliph’s palace 
and were coerced to 
sign their names on the document without 
regard to their theological affiliation.(59)  The 
Qādirī Creed, which was made an official state 
theology during the reign of al-Qā‘im, adds 
the characterization of kufr to the fisq; it reads 
in part:
“The speech (kalam) of Allāh is uncreated. 
He spoke it and sent it down to His Messenger 
Abū al-Ħasan al-Ash‘arī himself declares 
that “the fate of children is left for Allāh; 
He may torment them or do what He 
pleases with them
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peace be upon him through the agency of 
Gabriel, who heard it from Him and then 
recited it to Muħammad, peace be upon him, 
and Muħammad recited it to his companions, 
who recited it to the community.  It did not 
become created when created people recited 
it, because it is the same speech which Allah 
spoke; therefore – whether it is being recited, 
memorized, written or heard – it is uncreated. 
Anyone who says that it is created, in any 
sense, is kāfir and his blood can be shed after 
being asked to repent [and failing to do so.]”(60)
At the core of this dispute is the Ash‘arī 
belief that speech is an attribute of Allāh and 
that all His attributes are eternal.  However, 
they separate this “eternal” speech from the 
letters, sounds and words to be found in the 
Qur‘ān and the other books.  These, they say, 
are means to express the speech, but not the 
speech itself.  Therefore, they can change 
according to time, place and language – while 
the actual speech remains unchanged.  The 
letters, sounds and words are, according to the 
Ash‘arīs, created in the prophets, the angels 
and the tree that became a means of divine 
communication with Mūsā.(61)  This is also the 
belief of the traditionists (ahl al-ħadīth) with 
the only exception being the Ħanbalīs who 
believe that the speech of Allāh is identical 
with the letters and sounds and it is eternal. 
Some of them are said to have gone as far 
as claiming that the cover of the Book (the 
Qur‘ān) is eternal.(62)
The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, also 
believe that the speech of Allāh is the same as 
the letters and sounds that convey it, but they 
adopted the opposite doctrine.  The speech of 
Allāh consists of the letters and sounds which 
Allāh created in the minds of the prophets, the 
angels and the tree that became a means for 
communication with Mūsā. Nothing outside 
these books, according to the Mu‘tazila, can 
be called the speech of Allāh.  Hence, the 
speech is an attribute like all other attributes. 
(63)
The Ash‘arīs objected that the Mu‘tazilī 
belief in the createdness of the Qur‘ān, 
which contains “Allāh al-Raħmān al-Raħīm,” 
necessitates that Allāh is created, for they 
At some point, even Muslim prisoners of 
war were not ransomed if they did not 
attest that the Qur‘ān was created, not 
eternal
In 420/1029, the Caliph al-Qādir endorsed 
a decree considering those who believed 
in the createdness of the Qur‘ān in a state 
of fisq
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believe that the name Allāh is coterminous 
with the Essence.(64) ‘Abd al-Jabbār responded 
by saying that by the same logic then we have 
to believe that the horses, mules and donkeys 
are eternal, because they are also mentioned 
in the text of the Qur‘ān.(65)
The Imāmī position as articulated by al-Ħillī 
concurs with the Mu‘tazilī in the sense that 
the speech of Allāh occurs in time, like that of 
all created beings.  ‘Allāmah al-Ħillī says that 
“there is no doubt about Allāh’s being a speaker 
(mutakallim), meaning that He brought into 
being (awjada) certain letters and audible 
sounds which reside 
in the bodies, as He 
spoke to Mūsā through 
the agency of the tree 
when He placed in it 
the sounds and letters.” 
Then al-Ħillī attacks 
the Ash‘arīs saying that 
they “negated their 
own intellects and the 
intellects of the rest 
of humanity when 
they claimed for Him 
(the Exalted) a speech 
neither they, nor anyone 
else understands what it is.”  Al-Ħillī finally 
says that both reason and tradition agree that 
Allāh’s speech is not eternal, “because it is 
made of letters and sounds.  And since it is not 
possible to combine two letters in time, then 
one of them must come before the other, and 
anything which is preceded by something else 
must be created.”(66)
There is, however, a separate dispute 
on the terminology used to refer to the 
createdness of the Qur‘ān.  The Mu‘tazila 
defend the use of the word makhlūq to mean 
created in time.  Qāđi ‘Abd al-Jabbār presents 
a lengthy argument justifying the use of the 
word makhlūq and rejecting all objections.
(67) The Shī‘a disagree with this use and prefer 
the word muħdath, 
because the Qur‘ān 
is not described in its 
text or by the Prophet 
as makhlūq, whereas 
the word muħdath is 
present in two different 
Qur‘ānic verses (Q. 
21:2 and 26:5).  Al-
Mufīd writes, “I say 
that the Qur‘ān is the 
speech of Allāh and His 
inspiration (waħy) and 
it is created (muħdath), 
as described by Allāh 
the Exalted, but I forbid the use of the word 
makhlūq.”(68) The reason for this preference 
pertains to the customary use of the word 
The Ash‘arīs objected that the Mu‘tazilī 
belief in the createdness of the Qur‘ān, 
which contains “Allāh al-Raħmān al-
Raħīm,” necessitates that Allāh is created, 
for they believe that the name Allāh 
is coterminous with the Essence.‘Abd 
al-Jabbār responded by saying that by 
the same logic then we have to believe 
that the horses, mules and donkeys are 
eternal, because they are also mentioned 
in the text of the Qur‘ān
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makhlūq in Arabic.  As al-Shaykh al-Ţūsī 
articulates it:
“As to describing [Allāh’s] speech as 
makhlūq, it is inappropriate according to our 
doctrine because custom and convention 
describe speech as makhlūq only when it is 
either false or falsely attributed to other than 
its speaker.”(69)
The other controversy concerning the 
Qur‘ān taking place at the time pertained to 
the claims that it had been, or might have 
been, altered at some point during its official 
compilation.  Al-Mufīd gives a full account 
of the Imāmī position on this question, 
acknowledging the existence of many reports 
on such alterations.  However, he looks at three 
primary concerns: order of the text, loss of 
some text and addition of some text.  First he 
cites what he called 
the evident change 
in the arrangement 
of the chapters in the 
Qur‘ān, which is not 
consistent with the 
chronological order 
of their revelation. 
As to the loss of some text, al-Mufīd says that 
reason does not consider such a happening 
impossible.  However, he does not claim 
having any evidence that such loss actually 
occurred.  As to the change by the addition 
of text, al-Mufīd speaks of two hypothetical 
cases.  It is impossible, he says, that someone 
should have added a chapter without being 
detected by the learned.  What is possible, 
says al-Mufīd, is that a word or two may have 
been added here or there, not amounting to a 
whole phrase.  He does not claim such changes 
actually occurred and in fact believes that 
they did not occur.  He says that a ħadīth from 
Imām Ja‘far al-şādiq supports his position that 
the Qur‘ān was never changed in this manner, 
although Banū Nawbakht – from the Imāmī 
side – claimed otherwise.(70)
The same position was presented by al-
Murtađā and al-Ţūsī, the latter saying in the 
introduction to his authoritative commentary 
on the Qur‘ān that it is the consensus among 
Muslims that no 
addition was made 
to the text.  As to 
any loss of text, he 
says that the general 
sense in all Muslim 
schools of thought is 
that no such loss has 
occurred.  He goes on to report accounts in 
circulation that are contrary to this consensus, 
saying that these are single-sourced reports 
which neither yield knowledge, nor necessitate 
practice.  It is best to ignore them.(71)
The Mu‘tazila held the belief in the 
unconditional fulfillment of Allāh’s promise (al-
wa‘d) and threat (al-wa‘īd) as one of their five 
pillars of theology (al-ušūl al-khamsah)
Kufa Review: The Theological Debate in Baghdad in the 5th/11th Century
71KUFA REVIEW: No.2 - Issue 1 - Winter 2013
ALLÀH’S PROMISES AND THREATS
The Mu‘tazila held the belief in the 
unconditional fulfillment of Allāh’s promise 
(al-wa‘d) and threat (al-wa‘īd) as one of their 
five pillars of theology (al-ušūl al-khamsah). 
Their conviction was based on the Mu‘tazilī 
principle that Allāh does not do what is 
improper (qabīħ).  If He states that sinners 
will be punished and does otherwise in the 
hereafter, His statement would be a lie.  But 
lying is qabīħ, hence He must punish the 
sinners who do not repent.  While some 
late Bašrans, like ‘Abd al-Jabbār, allowed 
for the forgiveness of sinners, the Baghdādī 
Mu‘tazila insisted on the original belief, 
considering it obligatory (wājib) on Allāh to 
fulfill both His promise and threat.(72)  Indeed, 
for the Mu‘tazila of Baghdād, the fulfillment 
of Allāh’s threat is even more likely than the 
fulfillment of His promise, because the former 
is wājib, while the latter, according to them, is 
contingent on Allāh’s magnanimity.(73)
As for the Ash‘arīs, their belief is based on 
the principle of Allāh’s justice which considers 
any act He performs to 
be just.  Therefore, He 
judges as He wills on 
the Day of Judgment. 
Whether He fulfills His 
promise and threat or not, He will be acting 
in His own domain and there is no higher 
authority to judge or revoke His acts.  He may 
even reverse the fulfillment of the promise 
and threat by punishing for the good and 
rewarding the evil.  Imām al-Ħaramayn says:
“The reward, according to the people 
of true belief, is not a preordained right, 
or a confirmed compensation.  Rather, it is 
generosity from Allāh.  And punishment is not 
obligatory either; if it occurs, then it is justice 
from Allāh.”(74)
The basis of this Ash‘arī argument is that 
any worship and obedience perfromed by the 
human is an act of gratitude for the countless 
bounties he already received.  As such, worship 
and obedience represent an incomplete form 
of the compensation due to Allāh and they 
earn the doer no deserved reward.  Therefore, 
no one is owed anything in the hereafter.(75)
The Imāmī position affirms that it is 
incumbent upon Allāh to fulfill His promise, 
but not His threat.  Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd rejects 
the Mu‘tazilī position that Allāh would be 
breaking His word if He did not fulfill his 
threat.  He says:
If Arabs and non-
Arabs agree that 
forgiveness after a threat 
is considered good, 
The Imāmī position affirms that it is 
incumbent upon Allāh to fulfill His 
promise, but not His threat
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and that the person who practices it deserves 
no blame, then forgiveness after a threat from 
Him, the Exalted, cannot 
be improper (qabīħ).”(76)
The Mu‘tazila 
framed their theological 
arguments concerning 
the wa‘īd according to 
the concept of iħbāţ, 
which stipulates that a 
person who commits a 
sinful act would cause 
his previous good 
deeds and obedience to Allāh to be nullified. 
However, some Mu‘tazila – like Abū Hāshim 
al-Jubbā‘ī and his followers – believe in the 
balancing of good deeds against bad deeds 
to determine the outcome of a person’s fate.
(77) The Imāmiyya, except Banū Nawbakht, 
rejected this concept.(78)  The only deed they 
would consider as causing iħbāţ would be 
associating other deities with Allāh, which is a 
matter of consensus among all Muslims.
As the discussion has revealed so far, there 
has been a reformation in the Ash‘arī doctrines 
in the course of the 5th/11th century, as 
seen in the work of Imām al-Ħaramayn and 
some of the writings of Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī 
before him.  By the end of the century, 
Ash‘arī theologians have already dissociated 
themselves from many of the interpretations 
that al-Ash‘arī himself had put forward, such 
as the affirmation of Allāh’s possession of 
a hand, a face and 
other attributes that 
might border on 
anthropomorphism. 
Instead, the new Ash‘arī 
theology took an 
interpretive approach 
close to the Imāmī 
and Mu‘tazilī methods 
of ta‘wīl, considering 
the verses about such 
attributes as figurative 
speech.  However, in spite of this reformation, 
Ash‘arī doctrines remained at a great 
distance from both their Imāmī and Mu‘tazilī 
counterparts.
In their turn, the Mu‘tazila and the 
Imāmiyya continued to distinguish themselves 
from one another.  As seen in the debate on al-
wa‘d and al-wa‘īd, the two schools maintained 
their differences concerning the subtleties 
of almost every debated subject.  Three of 
the five Mu‘tazilī theological pillars (al-ušūl 
al-khamsah) remained in dispute or total 
rejection by the Shī‘a.  The other two – namely, 
‘adl and tawħīd – were also nuanced by slight, 
yet very significant, differences.  However, the 
main point of difference that separated the 
two groups was the doctrine of the imamate, 
which is out of this paper’s scope.
By the end of the century, Ash‘arī 
theologians have already dissociated 
themselves from many of the 
interpretations that al-Ash‘arī himself had 
put forward, such as the affirmation of 
Allāh’s possession of a hand, a face and 
other attributes that might border on 
anthropomorphism
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